In standard public finance theory a government's cost of borrowing depends on the common beliefs held by rational investors regarding default risk. We advance understanding of the effects of diverse beliefs and overconfidence among investors in their ability to assess the sovereign's creditworthiness. Theoretically, we find that demand for insurance against default is positively related to the absolute difference between the market price of sovereign risk and the risk forecasted by the economy's fundamentals. We find preliminary support for this prediction in a newly available dataset on sovereign credit default swaps (CDSs): after controlling for the size of the public debt, the absolute size of the gap between the actual and forecasted spreads is positively related to the value of outstanding CDSs.
Introduction
In this paper we present a theory and evidence of heterogeneous investor expectations and excessive trade in the market for insurance against sovereign default. The motivation for the study is the diversity of default risk pricing faced by developed countries and emerging markets after the 2008-09 financial crisis. For instance, the cost of insuring against default by the Euro area's peripheral members remains higher than the insurance cost for several fiscally comparable emerging markets (Aizenman et al. forthcoming) . To explain how economies with similar fundamentals can lead to different prices for default risk we present a model where agents are overconfident in their ability to beat the market. As a result, agents with a favorable signal ("optimists") regarding default risk supply insurance to the remaining agents ("pessimists"). The model predicts that agents trade more insurance when the market-assessed default risk is either higher or lower than the forecasted risk. We find evidence consistent with these predictions using a new dataset on sovereign credit default swaps (CDSs): after controlling for the size of the public debt, the absolute value of the market-forecasted spread difference is positively related to the stock of outstanding CDSs. Due to the limited number of observations and variables in the dataset, however, we prefer to interpret the findings as tentative and leave more thorough empirical testing to future work. The paper's key theoretical assumption that investors are overconfident in their ability to beat the market follows the literature in behavioral finance linking psychological factors to 3 irrational investment behavior and inefficient financial markets (Barberis et al. 1998 , Chui et al. 2010 , DeBondt and Thaler 1995 . According to Odean (1998 Odean ( , p. 1889 , who also provides an overview of the literature in both psychology and economics, "A review of the psychology literature on inference finds that people systematically underweight abstract, statistical, and highly relevant information, and overweight salient, anecdotal, and extreme information." For the purpose of formal modeling, Odean (1998) follows Kyle and Wang (1997) , Daniel et al. (1998) and Wang (1998) in assuming that overconfidence implies investors overestimate the precision of their information. More precisely, in all four papers investors overestimate the precision of their private signals concerning an asset value. 1 In Benos (1998) they overestimate the precision of every market participant's signal. We instead assume investors underestimate the precision of signals received by others and therefore believe that the market price they observe may be misleading. Equivalently, they might know the precision of the signals of others, but underestimate others' ability to interpret and act appropriately on the signals. In other words, we assume investors underweight statistical information (the precision of the market price), whereas previous work assumes they overweight anecdotal information (the precision of private signals). 2 1 Nikolic (2011) finds evidence consistent with the predictions of Daniel et al. (1998) .
2 Odean (1998 Odean ( , pp. 1894 briefly discusses our modeling approach as an alternative to his own. Although mathematically underweighting the information of others or overweighting one's own information may yield similar results, at least in the simplest models, they are conceptually different sources of inefficiency.
Addressing underweighting of statistical information may require convincing agents to "trust the statistics".
Investors in this paper believe they are rational, but that the other investors and the market may be irrational.
The paper also relates to the finance literature on CDSs. The pricing of CDSs and their effects on borrowing costs have attracted significant attention since the global crisis of 2008-09. A complicating factor is that most CDS contracts are traded over the counter (OTC) and various trading motives tend to intertwine (e.g., counter-party risk, hedging, and speculation). Ang and Longstaff (2011) find that systemic risk components in CDS spreads are less correlated across states in the US than across the US and the Euro countries. The difference in correlations is strongly associated with the systemic effects of global financial market variables. Che and Sethi (2011) show that naked CDS trading can divert a CDS seller's capital into collateral for a speculative position, and away from potential borrowers, thereby increasing borrowing costs and the likelihood of default. In both Che and Sethi (2011) and this paper the reason agents contract on CDSs is their heterogeneous beliefs regarding sovereign default risk. The papers differ since Che and Sethi endogenize the level of sovereign borrowing but do not explain why investors hold heterogeneous beliefs. In contrast, we take the sovereign debt stock as a given and derive investor beliefs from an underlying information environment. In particular, we show that investor beliefs can remain diverse even when the market price is fully revealing, that is, it summarizes Addressing overweighting of private information may require them to be skeptical of what they hear from friends and colleagues etc. 5 investors' joint information. Another difference to Che and Sethi (2011) is that we are able to test our model in a new dataset on sovereign CDSs. Geanakoplos (2009) shows that heterogeneous beliefs can interact with leverage to increase the volatility of asset prices.
The reason is that assets are bought by the most optimistic investors, and therefore increasing leverage increases the optimism of the marginal investor. Leveraging thus increases asset demand before the asset's true value becomes revealed and demand systematically drops. Like Che and Sethi (2011), Geanakoplos (2009) focuses on the consequences rather than causes of heterogeneous beliefs. Finally, Bruneau et al. (2012) link CDS mispricing to investor sentiments in a multiple-equilibrium model of the European sovereign debt crisis. Their paper may suggest that the interaction between diverse investor beliefs and multiple equilibriums, or between mispricing in related asset markets, is an important avenue for future research.
Both the model and the evidence in the paper contrast with models of sovereign risk based on common rather than heterogeneous investor beliefs. In fundamentals-based models of default risk (Acharya et al. 2011, Aizenman et al. forthcoming ) the riskiness of debt should increase insurance demand when agents are risk-averse. However, insurance demand then depends on the risk of default, and not on the difference between the market and forecasted default risks emphasized in the present paper. In multiple equilibrium-based models of default risk (Calvo 1988, Cole and Kehoe 2000) the market-assessed risk generally differs from the forecasted risk, since investors may not choose the equilibrium 6 the forecaster expected. 3 However, again insurance demand should depend on the actual default risk and not the forecasting error for that risk. It is true that if the market chooses a high-rather than low risk equilibrium the market risk may exceed the forecasted risk. in that case the market-forecasted spread difference may be correlated with high actual risk.
However, in that case the converse should also hold: economies where investors choose a low-risk equilibrium, and therefore the market risk is below the forecasted risk, should have safer sovereign debt and occasion less insurance demand. We find the opposite in the data: even economies where the market-assessed risk is below the fundamentalsforecasted spread have higher insurance demand than economies where the market and forecasted risks are similar.
In the remainder of the paper, Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 presents evidence linking the gap between market-assessed and forecasted sovereign default risk to demand for insurance using a novel dataset on credit default swaps. The conclusion is in Section 4.
Theoretical Model
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We assume a government with a stock of outstanding debt B and a continuum of symmetric risk-neutral investors with finite liquidity. These investors can potentially trade insurance against default in the form of credit default swaps (CDSs). Because a CDS trader need not be a debt holder the model allows for naked swaps. The debtor's fundamentals are either good (g) or bad (b) with probability 0.5 of each. Good fundamentals imply default risk 
signal. Due to the law of large numbers, the proportion of agents receiving a correct signal is also p . We denote the market price of insurance against default -the CDS spread -when fundamentals are good process the information adequately. In that case, while the actual fraction receiving the correct signal is p , the fraction assessing the risk correctly is only
: the 8 fraction whose signal and interpretation are both correct, pq, plus the fraction who fail on both accounts,
. In turn, the chance that most market participants will act based on the signal most of them received is
. Since the market price depends on how the majority acts, as we show below, each investor believes the market is wrong, and she can potentially beat it, with probability ) 1 (   .
Outcome with rational investors
With rational investors the law of large numbers implies that the market price of insurance is perfectly informative: a market price of
of the agents received the good signal. Therefore the fundamentals are good with probability one.
Since the market is always right any rational agent ignores her private signal. Thus, with good fundamentals the CDS spread must be 
Outcome with overconfident investors
When investors are overconfident they think that the market is only right with probability 1   . Thus, when the fundamentals are good (the argument is symmetric when fundamentals are bad) an agent's belief in good fundamentals depends on her signal:
where (1) is the perceived probability that fundamentals are good given a good signal and a market price reflecting most other investors got the good signal. Similarly, (2) is the perceived probability fundamentals are bad given a bad signal and the market price reflecting most other investors got the good signal. The inequality in (2) follows from
and implies that a worse private signal makes investors more pessimistic.
Investors with bad and good signals -henceforth denoted pessimists with superscript p and optimists with superscript o -will value insurance against default as follows:
where (3) is the subjective likelihood of default given the bad signal and therefore the perceived likelihood of good fundamentals in equation (1). Similarly, (4) is the likelihood of default with perceived likelihood of good fundamentals (2). The last inequality uses
Since optimists value insurance less, they are willing to sell it to the pessimists. The perceived gain to insurance trade is
where the inequality uses
and that the weight on the first term is less in the first compared to the second brackets since ).
Proceeding symmetrically shows that in the bad-fundamentals state pessimists and optimists value insurance at
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The inequality in (7) implies that there is again a perceived gain from optimists selling insurance to pessimists. 
. On the other hand, the best price prediction an econometrician -or other agents with access only to public information -can make is the
. The gap between the market and forecasted CDS spreads -the forecast error -is therefore
in the good state and
in the bad state. As investors become more realistic about their ability to outsmart the market (so  increases) two things happen. First, the absolute size of the forecast errors (8)-(9) decrease:
Second, the gain to insurance trade on the left hand side of (5) 
. In the limiting case of rational investors ( 1   ) the forecast errors are minimized at
and there is no gain to insurance trade.
In sum, the model predicts that the forecast error of agents with access only to public information should be positively correlated with gains to trade in insurance against default.
We now proceed to test this prediction in a new dataset on sovereign credit default swaps. Table 1 reports statistics for sovereign debt, bond yields, and outstanding sovereign CDS contracts for fifty countries with available data for 2010-11. We report several proxies for the riskiness of the debt in the following columns. Column (3) provides the market spread 13 of sovereign credit default swap (CDS) contracts as of December 2010. 4 The CDS spread indicates the quarterly payments that must be paid by the buyer of a CDS to the seller for the contingent claim in the case of a credit event (i.e. non-payment, forced restructuring) of sovereign debt. It is therefore a good proxy for the market price of insurance. Emerging markets and the peripheral Euro-area countries of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, are at the high end of the risk spectrum.
Empirical Evidence
In column (4) we provide forecasted CDS spreads based on macroeconomic fundamentals, including the lagged CDS spread, the TED spread, trade openness, inflation, and the debt/tax base ratio. These forecasts are drawn from Aizenman et al (forthcoming), to whom we refer for further details. Comparing columns (3) and (4) shows that the gap between the market and forecasted spreads (the forecast error) can be large and varies significantly across countries. Default risk for the peripheral Euro-area countries appears to be over-priced given their fundamentals. Conversely, the risk for several emerging markets, such as Brazil, Peru, Russia, the Philippines, and South Africa, is under-priced.
Column (5) reports the market-assessed default probability (including the probability of 4 The CDS prices are based on London closing values of five-year tenor contracts as of 31 st December 2010.
CMA Datavision compiles the CDS values from a consortium of thirty-five major buy-side participants in the swap markets. The sovereign CDS spreads are priced in basis points, with a basis point equal to $1,000 to insure $10 million of debt. debt restructuring) based on the CDS spread. 5 As expected, this default probability is positively correlated with the market CDS spread, the forecasted spread, and the sovereign bond yield (column 6). Although the correlation between the yield and the market CDS spread is only .46, the literature suggests that the bond-yield CDS spread correlation varies significantly across time and countries (Favero and Giavazzi 2005; and Chen et al. forthcoming) . 6 The main contribution of our paper is to link the price and quantity of sovereign default insurance to the forecast error on the price of insurance. The theoretical model predicts that insurance demand should be positively related to the absolute gap between the market-assessed and forecasted risks. Newly published data, which are presented in columns 7-11 of Table 1 , enable us to test the model. The average daily turnover of CDSs and the number of trades per day from January -March 2011 are in columns 7-8. The data shows that market activity for sovereign CDS contracts differs markedly across countries and is positively associated with the size of government debt. It is also correlated with the value of the stock of outstanding CDS contracts measured by gross claims, net claims, and 5 CMA reports the cumulative default probability for the five-year period, calculated using a proprietary credit valuation model and sovereign CDS data.
the number of contracts in columns 9-11. 7 Figure 1 plots the relationship between the market-assessed default probability in column 5 and gross CDSs outstanding relative to government debt. Although risk and insurance in Figure 1 are positively correlated, 8 it is not a tight relationship. Table 2 summarizes the results of cross-country regressions of market CDS activity on the size of public debt and the forecast errors. 9 Since the model makes predictions for total trade in CDSs our main dependent variable is the stock of gross outstanding CDSs. We begin by documenting a positive association between CDS holdings and government debt in column (1). In column (2) we add the forecasting errors. In columns (3)- (5) we control for measures of the riskiness of the debt, including the bond yield, the forecasted risk and the default probability. Columns (6)- (8) The results show that total government debt is significant at the 1 percent level in all specifications. Increasing government debt by 1 percent is estimated to increase the daily CDS turnover by 0.67 percent (column iv) and the notional gross and net CDS outstanding by about 0.5 percent. 10 The remaining columns show that both positive forecast errors (when the market-assessed risk exceeds the forecasted risk) and negative errors (the opposite) are positively and significantly related to outstanding CDSs. Adding the controls for risk in columns (3)- (5) decreases the coefficients on the forecast errors, but both remain significant. Compared to column (1) adding the forecast errors in column (2) increases R 2 from 0.49 to 0.6. As noted, while the positive signs and significance of both forecast errors is consistent with the model of overconfident investors, it appears inconsistent with models of sovereign risk under common investor beliefs. Additional robustness checks (available on request from the authors) also remain consistent with the model. Nonetheless, given the small size of the dataset we prefer to interpret the evidence as supportive of the model but tentative. We therefore hope to test the model in a larger dataset in the future.
Conclusion
We use a combination of a public debt model and new market data to understand the price and volume of international purchases of insurance against sovereign default. The model assumes that investors are overconfident in their ability to beat the market. It predicts a positive correlation between the error in forecasting default risk based on public information -the absolute difference between the market and forecasted CDS spreadsand trade in default insurance. We find preliminary support for this prediction in a newly available dataset on sovereign credit default swaps (CDSs): after controlling for the size of the public debt, the absolute size of the gap between the actual and forecasted spreads is positively related to the value of outstanding CDSs. We conclude that heterogeneous investor beliefs and overconfidence may be important in driving trade in CDSs. This table provides data and statistics for main variables in the theoretical model of Section 2. The total government debt data are from the latest International Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook statistics on gross government debt as of December 2010. Debt/tax is the average ratio of 2008-2010 total government debt relative to average previous tax base in the previous 5 years. Market CDS spreads are based on the London closing values of 5-year tenor sovereign CDS contracts, in basis points. Like CDS, a market probability of sovereign default is from CMA Datavision. Forecasted CDS spreads are based on the dynamic panel regression of market CDS spreads on fundamental variables, including lagged CDS, TED spread, trade openness, inflation, fiscal space; see Aizenman, Hutchison, and Jinjarak (forthcoming) for detailed estimation. Sovereign bond yields are based on JP Morgan series (EMBI Global Diversified and Government Bond Index (GBI)) for the middle-income countries and emerging markets; from OECD statistics (10-yr bonds;stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=86) for non-Euro OECD; and from Eurostat for the Euro-area countries (ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/long/html/index.en.html). The CDS turnover and notional amounts of CDS outstanding are based on the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC). This figure provides a scatter-plot of the market-estimated probability of sovereign default (%) against the size of notional gross CDS outstanding relative to the size of total government outstanding debt at the end of December 2010. The fitted line is weighted by the total government debt (in billion of US$). Table 1 provides the statistics and detailed descriptions of data sources.
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